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“An excessive concentration of power is indeed a dangerous thing: it has happened in this country 
many times and as a rule it has either led to stagnation or to civil war. We must not allow that. 
Attempts to build up power to fit a certain individual are dangerous. If they do not cause trouble 
today you must not doubt that they will cause great problems for the country and for the individual in 
the not-too-distant future. We must think about this and remember the lessons of history.”  
Remarks by President Medvedev during an official visit to the city of Kostoma, 13 May 2011
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ussia is now absorbed in the burning question of who will stand for President in 2012. 
Kremlinologists at home and abroad are desperately trying to read the meaning of 
indirect remarks and hints from the President and Prime Minister. All is speculation. 
But Medvedev’s statement is about as clear as one can be. It should not be Putin. 
Putin has himself on various occasions assured public opinion that, whatever the decision, it 
would be arrived at by the two of them in agreement together. This seems intended to reassure 
people that political uncertainty and instability will be avoided. But it would also be the most 
basic denial of democratic choice for the people. 
The two men have for most of their duumvirate observed impressive discipline in their 
division of labour and abstaining, in large part, from issuing contradictory statements. Putin 
has been running the government. Mevedev has been doing foreign affairs and, while 
interested in domestic affairs, has largely steered clear of second-guessing the Prime Minister. 
The state television’s news programmes have been absolutely impeccable, always covering 
what each of the two men did that day; indeed never is there a day when one of them did 
something important while the other did nothing newsworthy. But there have been times 
when differences could be suspected and more recently differences have become more 
explicit, and a competition between alternative political concepts has emerged.  
Putin stands for his re-establishment of the vertical power at home and restoring respect for 
Russia as a great power internationally. Medvedev positions himself as moderniser, democrat 
and ardent advocate of the rule of law. The differences could be summarised in terms of 
political slogans – ‘continuity versus change’, or ‘power versus values’ – applicable in both 
domestic and foreign policies. 
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Medvedev’s modernisation agenda is a fusion of the domestic and external, echoing the 
tradition developed by Peter the Great. In domestic economic policy, Putin has tended to 
restore the power of the state in major enterprises, placing his ex-KGB lieutenants in many 
key positions. Medvedev has recently acted in precisely the opposite direction with a decree 
that government office holders should not combine their functions with positions on the board 
of state-controlled enterprises. Vice Prime Minister Sechin was obliged to resign from the 
board of Rosneft and Finance Minister Kudrin from the board of the partly privatised VTB 
bank. This move symbolised an intent to modernise Russia’s corporate governance methods, 
to separate business from government interests more clearly and to combat corruption at the 
highest level. It was also marking the need for renewal of the Russian elite, moving on from a 
system dominated by a clique of former KGB officers.  
But the domestic political agenda goes far wider and deeper. Medvedev has made the rule of 
law one of his hallmark initiatives. Yet as the Khodorkovsky case has shown, the President 
has been unable to free the judiciary from the political preferences of the Prime Minister. “In 
which dusty cellar did they dig up the poisonous Stalinist spider who wrote this drivel?” said 
Khodorkovsky on May 24
th at the Moscow court after hearing the judge’s conclusions leading 
to the rejection of his appeal over the second sentence on extending his imprisonment to 13 
years.
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A semi-independent view of the political agenda favoured by Medvedev can be read in 
documents published by the Institute for Contemporary Development, directed by Igor 
Jurgens. Their most recent 460-page report is entitled Agenda 2012, and is explicitly aiming 
at the presidential election.
3 It is a wide-ranging strategy, all quite reasonable to Western eyes. 
These documents are presented as normal think tank products, intended to feed the 
politician’s need for programme detail. Democracy and the rule of law are integral parts of 
Agenda 2012, and of Medvedev’s discourse. Putin meanwhile is making speeches essentially 
along the lines that drastic changes of course are not needed, after de-democratising the 
selection of regional governors, and now warning against “radical economic experiments”. 
In the foreign policy domain, differences could be suspected already in 2008 over the war 
with Georgia. While an external security affair for which the President is boss, it was Putin 
who arrived first on the scene in Vladikavkaz to direct the Russian invasion of South Ossetia 
and Georgia proper. But very recently there has been explicit disagreement over Libya. Russia 
abstained over the UN Security Council Resolution 1973, which amounted to acquiescence to 
the French-British intent to intervene militarily. When Putin then denounced this as a 
“crusade”, Medvedev slapped him down, calling his remarks “unacceptable”. Putin then had 
to remark that the President had indeed responsibility for foreign policy. Less dramatically 
Medvedev has been in the forefront of diplomacy with the EU to develop a ‘Modernisation 
Partnership’. His analysis is that Russia is not on course to achieve its strategic modernization 
objective, and to do better requires closer cooperation with Europe and the West, and this in 
turn requires a certain convergence in foreign policy stances.   
These differences are perfectly normal politics. But still they add up to a matter of strategic 
political choice for the nation, and indeed legitimate choice over both the programme and the 
person.  
This leads back to the question who should make this choice. It would be condescending if 
not insulting for the Russian people for Medvedev and Putin to settle the matter in a private 
conversation, after which one of them announces that he will back the other. The ideal 
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solution would surely be for both Medvedev and Putin to stand for President. It would mark a 
huge step forward in the maturing of Russian democracy. It would also represent smooth 
political development and stability, since both men are experienced and skilled in the exercise 
of government. It would avoid a risky plunge into the unknown. It would be a strikingly 
elegant political move, which would have a hugely positive impact of Russia’s international 
reputation, and become a source of pride for the Russian people – ‘we agreeably surprised 
ourselves’. If the people preferred Putin after a fair and open campaign, so be it. The reverse, 
for example an announcement that the two men had agreed that Putin would stand again, 
would be a huge step backwards. Putin for another decade, chosen by Putin and not the 
people, would put him into the same league as the now-discredited Arab authoritarianism. As 
the Arab world goes forward, will Russia go into reverse? 